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Anonymity is perhaps the most valued feature of the Internet as its users are able to conceal their 
true identities or assume pseudonyms in the cyber world. Anonymity may be good for freedom of 
speech as any speakers could freely express their thoughts without the fear of being identified (though 
not impossible). Unfortunately, anonymity poses great challenges to law enforcement agencies as 
they would face difficulty in tracing cyber offenders. For that reason, the Malaysian Parliament has 
passed a new section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 that has the effect of shifting the burden of proof 
on the alleged offenders to prove his innocence. This provision seems to be in contrast with the legal 
maxim of ‘semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit’ which means ‘he who asserts must 
prove’. This same principle has also been adopted in Islamic criminal law as the Islamic legal maxim 
has explicitly stated that ‘the onus of proof is upon the claimant, and the taking of an oath is upon 
him who denies’. As such, this paper attempts to scrutinise the approach that has been adopted by 
judges in interpreting and applying this new law. Further, a comparative analysis with Islamic 
criminal law will be made in order to ascertain whether such principle could be applied in certain 
cases since cyber criminals are hardly traceable or identifiable. The study is largely based on 
doctrinal research as it is primarily concerned with the review of relevant decided cases and 
statutory provisions as well as text books, journal articles and seminar papers. To sum up, it is 
submitted that the new law does not amount to an automatic presumption of guilt as the prosecutors 
are still required to prove the existence of relevant basic facts before the accused is mandated to 
prove his innocence. 
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The Internet has, since its first inception in the United States in 19691, greatly affected almost 
all spheres of our lives. And in this Information Age, the future of the Internet looks much more 
ubiquitous as it appears to be seamlessly integrated into our daily activities. This is evidently 
reflected in the emerging development of the Internet of Things (IoT)2 as well as the steady 
surge of the Internet usage and penetration in all regions of the world.3 As for Malaysia, the 
Malaysian Statistics Department (2016) has recently recorded that 71.1 percent out of the total 
population of 31.19 million in 2015 aged 15 years and above had used the Internet.4 This has 
undoubtedly shown the widespread adoption and profuse acceptance of the Internet in the 
country. 
Unfortunately, the Internet has also been misused and exploited by unscrupulous 
individuals to commit various kinds of cybercrimes such as online scams, computer fraud, 
hacking, publication of unlawful materials and many others. Such concern is not unfounded or 
baseless as CyberSecurity Malaysia (2016) has recorded an average of 10,000 cybercrime cases 
every year. This alarming scenario is further exacerbated by the fact that most of these incidents 
are committed by anonymous offenders. In response to this pressing concern, the legislature 
has in 2012 passed section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 that was alleged to have arguably 
established the presumption of guilt (Peters, 2012). As such, it is appropriate to have a grasp on 
the subject of anonymity and its ramifications on existing statutory provisions governing 
cybercrime cases by analysing decided cases by local judges prior to and subsequent to the 
coming into force of section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950. In addition, a comparative analysis 
will be made with the position in the Islamic law in order to ascertain whether there exist any 
isolated situations that may invoke the presumption of guilt instead of presumption of 
innocence. 
 
ANONYMITY AND LEGAL QUANDARY 
 
Anonymity in simple terms refers to a person with no name or identity. It has been literally 
defined as the condition of being anonymous, whilst anonymous denotes a person unidentifiable 
by name or of unknown name (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). Similar definition has been adopted 
by Kabay (1998) when it was asserted that anonymity can be defined simply as being without 
a name or with an unknown name. A detailed analysis conducted by Silva and Reed (2015) 
depicted an anonymous person as someone who is unnamed, unidentified, unknown, 
unspecified, undesignated, unseen or unacknowledged. Anonymity is also commonly 
associated with pseudonym although the latter is mostly referred to the use of false name. 
Nonetheless, for ease of understanding in this paper, anonymity covers both anonymous and 
pseudonymous offenders. 
Social scientists have argued that anonymous persons tend to act differently when they 
cannot be identified (Burkell, 2006). On this note, Froomkin (1999) submitted that anonymity 
has both valuable and harmful consequences, and different persons weigh these outcomes 
differently. 
Zimmerman (2012) contended that anonymity empowers a sense of self-government 
and a greater range of self-expression in the cyber space. And with the availability of vast arrays 




of Internet based communications such as blogs, online forums, social networking sites like 
Facebook and Twitter etc., Wu (2005) argued that these online publications, in particular blogs, 
have rejuvenated the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression in 
Malaysia. Consequently, public debate and discussion on matters of public interest are easily 
accessible via these platforms. 
Nevertheless, these new media have also been resorted to disseminate and publish illicit 
content such as defamatory statements, seditious remarks, hate speech, indecent and obscene 
materials and many other harmful contents. In response to this, Dato’ Seri Utama Dr Rais 
Yatim, former Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, has in July 2001 announced that 
the government would not be hesitant to take stern actions against dangerous websites, 
particularly those that threatened the security of the country (Azmi, 2004). Legal actions against 
such offenders are theoretically possible as there are a number of specific statutes, especially 
the Computer Crimes Act 1997 (the CCA) and the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 
(the CMA), that have been specifically formulated to regulate and tackle cybercrimes and 
related offences on the Internet. Apart from that, the provisions of existing laws such as the 
Penal Code, the Defamation Act 1957 and the Sedition Act 1948 may also be extended and 
applied to the cyber world. But the applications of these laws against cyber criminals are not 
straightforward or smooth sailing as enforcement agencies and prosecutors are faced with a 
difficult task, though not technically impossible, in proving the true identities of anonymous 
offenders and holding them guilty in courts. 
The struggle in attributing and holding such criminals guilty for cybercrimes may be 
best illustrated with the case of Pendakwa Raya v Muslim bin Ahmad5. The respondent 
(accused) was charged for improper use of network facilities or network services under section 
233(1)(a) of the CMA for allegedly posting three offensive comments (“damn your sultan”, 
“your sultan kantoi” and “what’s the kantoi with your sultan”) on the Perak State Government’s 
official portal on 7 and 8 February 2009. He denied the charges and claimed to have been at 
work when the offensive comments were posted. Despite the fact that the comments were traced 
to originate from the respondent’s Internet protocol (IP) address, the learned Sessions Court 
judge had acquitted and discharged the respondent on the ground that the appellant had failed 
to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt since there was a slight possibility that someone else 
could have used the same IP address. However, the earlier decision by the court of first instance 
was reversed on appeal by the High Court as Amelia Tee Hong Geok Abdullah J ruled that the 
trial judge had erred in her findings as she did not consider the failure of the respondent to state 
his whereabouts during the commission of the alleged offence was merely a bare denial and 
thus did not raise any reasonable suspicion in the prosecution’s case. 
The difficulty encountered by the prosecution in proving the commission of cyber 
offences by those who hide behind the cloak of anonymity can also be seen in the subsequent 
case of PP v. 
 Rutinin Suhaimin.6 The case involved an appeal by the prosecution against the 
discharge and acquittal of the respondent (accused) at the end of the prosecution’s case. The 
respondent was charged under section 233 of the CMA for posting an offensive remark (“Sultan 
Perak sudah gilaaaa”) on the online visitor book of the homepage of the HRH Sultan of Perak. 
The court of the first instance decided that there was no prima facie case against the respondent 
as the appellant (prosecutor) failed to prove the offensive remark was posted by the respondent 




and that the Internet could have been accessed by anyone from the disputed computer. On 
appeal, the acquittal was quashed and the respondent was ordered to enter his defence. It was 
decided by Ravinthran Paramaguru JC that the trial judge had failed to consider the strength of 
circumstantial evidence by forensic expert indicating that the disputed Internet account 
belonged to the respondent and that there was no evidence that any other person used the 
computer at the time of the offence. Thus, the appeal was allowed and the respondent was 
required to enter his defence. 
The accused was then tried before another Sessions Court judge and he was later 
convicted for the offence and was sentenced to a fine of RM 15,000 in default eight months’ 
imprisonment. Dissatisfied with the decision, the accused (now the appellant) then lodged this 
appeal in Rutinin Suhaimin v PP7 in the High Court of Kota Kinabalu, Sabah. On appeal, the 
appellant insisted that he did not make the offensive remark though it originated from his 
Internet account as his computer and the Internet account were accessible by other persons 
continuously from 8 am to past 7 pm. It was observed by Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah & 
Sarawak) that the trial judge had erroneously held the defence was a mere denial as she failed 
to consider the appellant’s defence on the whole. Further, she appeared to have shifted the onus 
of proof on the appellant to prove his innocence and this approach was totally unacceptable as 
there was no such presumption under section 233 of the CMA. Apart from that, there was not 
an iota of evidence adduced by the prosecution that it was the appellant who actually made and 
initiated the transmission of the offensive remark. As a result, the appeal was allowed and the 
earlier conviction and sentence were set aside as the appellant was found to have successfully 
raised a reasonable doubt in his defence. 
The two cases above clearly demonstrate an uphill predicament faced by prosecutors in 
proving their cases beyond reasonable doubt against anonymous cyber criminals as only one 
reported case was ruled in favour of the prosecution. The anonymity issue has then prompted 
the Parliament to pass section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 that has the effect of shifting the 
burden of proof on the accused to prove his innocence. Nevertheless, the application of the new 
amendment has raised a baffling issue of whether it would have the effect of incorporating the 
presumption of guilt on the accused (Peters, 2012). If the answer to the question is in the 
affirmative, then it would possibly be in contravention with the established maxim of ‘semper 
necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit’, which means ‘he who asserts must prove’, and the 
general presumption of innocent until proven guilty. 
 
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
 
The presumption of innocence is a crucial right conferred on any accused person in criminal 
trials as he is legally presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
It is one of the two presumptions that may apply without proof of basic facts8. Since any person 
is presumed innocent by the law, the general burden of proof9 in criminal proceedings lies on 
the prosecution to prove the facts which constitute an offence by such a person (accused) 
beyond a reasonable doubt.10 At the same time, there is no similar burden placed on the accused 
to prove his innocence. The accused’s only obligation is to weaken the effect of the 
prosecution’s evidence by casting a reasonable doubt in the prosecution’s case. 
 




Nonetheless, the prosecution may rely on any available statutory presumptions, either 
presumption of fact or presumption of law, in order to prove one or more prerequisites of the 
charge against the accused11. Once the presumption has been successfully invoked by the 
prosecution, then the burden of proof will shift to the accused to rebut such presumption12. The 
implication of presumption has been highlighted by Thomson CJ in Ng Kim Huat v PP that 
“…while a statutory presumption, when it arises, may operate in place of evidence and so 
reverse the onus of proof of any point, the bare potential existence of such a presumption cannot 
of itself dispense with proof of any fact the existence of which is a condition precedent of the 
presumption arising”. Since statutory presumptions, in particular the disputed presumption of 
fact in section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950, appear to be in conflict with the presumption of 
innocence, it is pertinent to examine whether such presumption has really established the notion 
of presumption of guilt. 
 
SECTION 114A OF THE EVIDENCE ACT 1950 – PRESUMPTION OF GUILT? 
 
Section 114A was inserted as a new amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 vide the Evidence 
(Amendment) (No 2) Act 2012. The amendment was tabled on 18 April 2012 and was passed 
without substantial debate on 9 May 2012. It has now come into force starting from 31 July 
2012. Entitled as ‘Presumption of Fact in Publication’, the new statutory provision is similar to 
other presumptions that require the establishment of certain basic facts before such 
presumptions may be invoked by the court. Nonetheless, the passing of the amendment has led 
to a heated debate among certain groups in the society. The Centre for Independent Journalism 
(2012) has strongly objected to the new amendment on the perception that the presumption 
could lead to arbitrary arrest and prosecution of innocent persons. Ultimately, it was argued to 
be contrary to the basic principles of a fair legal system which presume a person is innocent 
until proven guilty by the prosecution. It was further alleged that section 114A will have a 
serious chilling effect on free speech on the basis that the public may simply resort to self-
censorship to avoid any unwarranted consequences. 
On the contrary, the proponent of this new amendment asserted that the enforcement 
agencies are still required to conduct comprehensive investigation to trace and identify the real 
suspects before making charges (The Sun Daily, 2012). This is in parallel with the explanation 
by the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department, Dato’ Seri Mohamed Nazri Aziz, during 
the Parliamentary debate which expressly stipulated that the prosecution must prove the 
existence of certain specific facts before the rebuttable presumption of fact under section 114A 
may be invoked (Hansard, 18 April 2012). 
 
Subsection (1) of section 114A states that: 
 
A person whose name, photograph or pseudonym appears on any publication depicting himself 
as the owner, host, administrator, editor or sub-editor, or who in any manner facilitates to 
publish or republish the publication is presumed to have published or re-published the contents 
of the publication unless the contrary is proved. 
Plain reading of the provision appears to presume any person as the publisher if his 
name, photograph or pseudonym is portrayed as the owner, host, administrator, editor or sub-




editor of such online content. In relation to this, Peters (2012) argued that subsection (1) of 
section 114A may implicate online intermediaries or any other persons who administer, operate 
or provide online forums or discussion groups. It was further argued that they may possibly be 
held accountable for the content even if they have no knowledge about it once it is proved that 
they facilitate the publication of any disputed content. Apart from that, Radhakrishna (2013) 
alleged that the presumption may affect victims of hacking and identity theft and they would 
have to bear the evidential burden of proving their innocence. 
Section 114A (1) has been applied in the case of YB Dato’ Hj Husam Hj Musa v Mohd 
Faisal Rohban Ahmad (2015). The appellant (plaintiff) sued the respondent (defendant) for 
publishing articles defamatory of him on a blog ‘ruangbicarafaisal.blogspot.com’. The trial 
judge found the articles were defamatory of the appellant, but still ruled in favour of the 
respondent on the ground that the appellant had failed to establish the respondent as the writer 
or owner of the blog in question without considering the coming into force of section 114A of 
the Evidence Act 1950. On appeal, it was ruled that the trial judge had failed to contemplate the 
application of the new amendment in the electronic environment as it will assist the appellant 
to force the respondent to exonerate himself from liability. Since the appellant had successfully 
linked the respondent to the defamatory posts via the latter’s photographs and his letter to other 
bloggers, the first presumption under section 114A was accordingly invoked. Consequently, 
the appeal was allowed as the respondent had failed to rebut the presumption of fact and his 
defence of mere denial was not accepted by the court. 
Subsection 1 of section 114A has again been referred to in Ahmad Abd Jalil lwn PP 
(2015). The appellant (accused) was convicted for posting offensive comments in Facebook 
using a pseudonym account of Zul Yahya. The appellant then appealed against his conviction 
on a number of grounds including that the disputed computer from which the offensive remarks 
were published on the pseudonym Facebook account of Zul Yahya, though was under his 
control, could have been accessed by anyone in his office and thus the presumption of 
publication invoked by the prosecution under section 114A should have failed. Nevertheless, 
the appeal was dismissed as the High Court found that based on relevant circumstantial 
evidence and forensic experts presented by the prosecution, the appellant had failed to rebut the 
presumption on a balance of probabilities. 
Based on the aforesaid judgments, it is apparent that the court would only permit the 
application of presumption of publication by the prosecutor (in criminal cases) or plaintiff (in 
civil suits) after the existence of relevant facts has been clearly established. Only then, the 
burden will be shifted to the offender to prove his innocence on a balance of probabilities. 
 
With regard to subsection (2) of section 114A which reads: 
 
A person who is registered with a network service provider as a subscriber of a network service 
on which any publication originates from is presumed to be the person who published or re-
published the publication unless the contrary is proved. 
A scrutiny of subsection (2) demonstrates that a registered subscriber may be regarded 
as publisher of any content if such content is proved to originate from his registered account. 
This could affect owners or operators of public places that offer free Wi-Fi services to their 
customers such as restaurants, cafes and many others. Further, Peters (2012) claimed that 




registered subscribers with unsecured Wi-Fi services could face problems if their Wi-Fi 
accounts are used by piggy-back riders to publish illegal content on the Internet. 
The presumption of publication in subsection (2) has been discussed in Tong Seak Kan 
& Anor v Loke Ah Kin & Anor (2014). In this case, the plaintiffs sued the first defendant for 
online defamation and as a result of a judgment in default, damages for the sum of RM 600,000 
were awarded to the plaintiffs. The first defendant then applied to set aside the judgment by 
claiming inter alia that he was neither the owner nor the publisher of the two blogs allegedly 
containing defamatory statements of the plaintiffs. The court found that confirmation by Google 
Inc. and two local network service providers offered conclusive evidence that the first defendant 
was the registered subscriber of the two blogs in question. By virtue of section 114A (2) of the 
Evidence Act 1950, the first defendant as the registered subscriber was presumed to be the 
publisher of the defamatory publication and consequently, was statutorily required to rebut the 
presumption by proof to the contrary on the balance of probability. Since the first defendant 
merely denied ownership of the two blogs without producing any evidence to rebut the 
presumption of publication under subsection (2) of section 114A, his application to set aside 
the earlier judgment in default was dismissed by the court. 
In the subsequent case of Dato’ Abdul Manaf Abdul Hamid v. Muhammad Sanusi Md 
Nor and Zulkifli Yahya (2014), the application of section 114A (2) of the Evidence Act 1950 
has again been invoked. The plaintiff sued the defendants for defamatory statements published 
in a Facebook account bearing the first defendant’s name and defamatory articles in a blog 
KedahLa.blogspot.com that were allegedly written by the two defendants. Nonetheless, the civil 
suit failed as the court observed that the plaintiff did not take any measures to identify the true 
owner of the disputed Facebook account as well as the actual authors or administrators of the 
defamatory entries in the blog. As such, it was decided that plaintiff could not rely on the 
presumption of publication in section 114A (2) as he failed to prove the defendants as the 
registered subscribers of the social network services. 
 
Apart from the two presumptions in subsections (1) and (2), a further presumption of 
publication is stipulated in subsection (3) that states: 
 
Any person who has in his custody or control any computer on which any publication originates 
from is presumed to have published or re-published the contents of the publication unless the 
contrary is proved. 
The potential implication of subsection (3) has been argued by Dazuki (2016) to render 
parents or guardians accountable for illicit content posted on the Internet by their children for 
the mere fact that the IP address is traced back to their computers. On the same note, it was 
further submitted that employers might get into trouble for illegal content posted by their 
employees using the office’s Internet and computers. The basis of the argument can be evidently 
illustrated by the above-mentioned case of Ahmad Abd Jalil lwn PP (2015) whereby the 
offensive comment was traced to have originated from one of the computers and the Internet 
facility in the appellant’s office. Nonetheless, instead of prosecuting the employer, the 
prosecution had based on technical experts and forensic evidence successfully identified and 
then brought criminal action only against the appellant. Finally, the court ruled that it was the 
computer under the appellant’s custody which was used to access the pseudonym Facebook 




account that posted the offensive remark. Thus, the presumption of publication under 
subsection (3) of has been successfully invoked by the prosecution against the appellant. 
With regard to the presumption in subsection (3) of section 114A, there are a few key 
words that need to be clearly explained. Firstly, the word ‘computer’, which has been given the 
same interpretation in both section 3 of the Evidence Act 1950 and section 2 of the Computer 
Crimes Act 1997, reads: 
 
An electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other data processing device, or a 
group such interconnected or related devices, performing logical, arithmetic, storage and 
display functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly 
related to or operating in conjunction with such device or group of such interconnected or 
related devices, but does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, or a portable hand 
held calculator or other similar device which is non-programmable or which does not contain 
any data storage facility. 
It is apparent that the word ‘computer’ has been statutorily defined in a comprehensive 
and all-embracing manner so as to include any electronic devices that are capable of performing 
the four required functions namely logical, arithmetic, storage and display. This would 
undoubtedly cover smartphones as well since they are able to perform the four stated functions 
and are currently being widely used to access the Internet and other web-based communication 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and many others. 
Another important key word is the phrase ‘custody or control’ which does not 
synonymously amount to ownership. This can be best illustrated in the case of Ahmad Abd Jalil 
lwn PP (2015) as the disputed computer belonged to the appellant’s employer but was put under 
his control or custody. As a result, the subsection (3) has been successfully invoked against him 
as it was evidently proved that the offensive comment originated from the computer that was 
under his control and thus, he was presumed to have published the content since he was unable 
to prove to the contrary. 
Apart from the position under the Evidence Act 1950, it is also pertinent to consider and 
compare the position of presumption of innocence versus presumption of guilt under the Islamic 
legal principles. 
 
Presumption f Innocence Under The Islamic Criminal Law 
 
The basic and essential principle in Islamic judicial system is the onus of proof lies on no other 
than the claimant / prosecutor. This is agreed upon by the Muslim jurists unequivocally. This 
principle is based on the Quranic verse where Allah said, “Say, … Bring forth your proofs, if 
you are truthful."(an-Naml :64) 
This verse insists on producing proof if someone claims certain facts that he believes 
them to be true. It is an inherent theme in the Holy Quran that someone will not be responsible 
for the sin of others. It is explicitly stipulated in the Holy Quran that “And no bearer of burdens 
will bear the burden of another” (al-Isra’ :15). This verse indirectly denotes that the presumption 
of guilt is not applicable to anyone unless for what is proven and admitted against him. 
Besides the Prophet also indicated the same principle as was reported by Ibnu ‘Abbas 
(radhiyAllahu ‘anhu) said that the Messenger of Allah (SallaAllahu ‘alayhi wasalalm) said: 




“…..were people to be given according to their claims, some would claim the wealth and blood 
of others. But the burden of proof is upon the claimant and the taking of an oath is upon the one 
who denies (the allegation)”. 
This hadith needs no further explanation as the Prophet clearly educated us that the 
burden of proof is upon the claimant. There is also consensus in Islamic legal maxim stating 
that “a person is originally free from any liability”. This maxim impliedly shows the 
responsibility of the claimant to bring the evidence to implicate others as everybody is free from 
any implication at the first place unless proven otherwise by any evidence. 
For the sake of this article, the very issue to be addressed is whether Islam allows the 
onus of poof to be shifted to the accused / defendant as per the position in section 114A of the 
Evidence Act 1950. The Islamic law jurists differ in ascertaining this issue. There are two 
opinions regarding this matter. The first group was of the opinion that the burden of proof 
cannot be shifted to the accused / defendant. This is the opinion of Hanafite, Ibadite and some 
hadith scholars like Imam al-Bukhari. Their argument was generally based on the hadith 
previously mentioned where the Prophet said, “But the burden of proof is upon the claimant 
and the taking of an oath is upon the one who denies (the allegation)”. This hadith showed on 
the distribution of burden of proof and yamin and this distribution cannot be tolerated. This 
hadith showed that the proof must be brought up by the claimant only and no indication that it 
can be shared by the accused / defendant. Their argument also comes from the hadith where the 
Prophet requested the proof from a group of people who accused a Jewish involving a murder 
case. They admitted that they do not have any proof and the Prophet did not shift the onus of 
proof to the accused.14 This is another clear indication on how the onus of proof stayed on the 
claimant. 
The second opinion took a different approach as it was agreed that the burden of proof 
can be shifted to the accused / defendant. This is the opinion of the majority of scholars 
including Shafiite, Malikite, Hanbalite and Shiite. Their argument is also based on hadith of 
“But the burden of proof is upon the claimant and the taking of an oath is upon the one who 
denies (the allegation)”. According to them, the request for the accused / defendant to perform 
yamin is an indirect indication that the burden of proof can be transferred. They considered that 
yamin asked by the Prophet as a shift of burden. Besides it is a consensus among the scholars 
that yamin can be shifted between the claimant and the accused so as the burden in verifying 
the truth. However, this opinion restricted such a shift to very limited situations, namely: 
 
i. In the case of yamin al-mardudah where the accused refused to perform yamin 
then right/burden to perform it returned to the claimant and he can gain his right through it. 
 
ii. In the case where the claimant brings only one witness, then he himself 
performed the yamin, then the burden of proof can be shifted to the accused/defendant. 
 
iii. The claimant brings the evidence then the burden can be shifted to the 
accused/defendant.  
 
iv. Lastly if the accused / defendant denies the claim which was forwarded by the 
claimant, then the denial must come with the evidence. 





All the above mentioned situations were enlisted by Dr. Muhammad Al-Zuhayli in his 
book wasail al-ithbat fi al-Shariah al-Islamiah in concluding the second opinion. However, 
according to the concluding situations as abovementioned, it is submitted that only the fourth 
situation appears to be relevant and ought to be examined side by side with section 114A of the 
Evidence Act 1950. The fourth situation has directly put the onus of proof on the accused / 
defendant to prove otherwise. This seems to be in parallel with what has been stipulated in 
section 114A that has the effect of establishing the presumption of publication on certain 




To sum up, section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 has introduced a new presumption of 
publication that empowers the prosecution or plaintiff in civil proceedings to rely on it in order 
to prove and attribute the identity of anonymous offender in the cyber world. Regardless of the 
coming into force of the new provision, it is pertinent to highlight that any person who wishes 
to rely on such a presumption must first establish the existence of certain basic facts before the 
presumption can be invoked. This general principle has been asserted by Abu Bakar Katar JC 
in the case of Dato’ Abdul Manaf Abdul Hamid (2014) that only if the plaintiff has successfully 
proved that the social website was registered under the defendant’s name, then the presumption 
of publication in section 114A of the Evidence Act 1950 may be prayed. On the contrary, the 
plaintiffs in the earlier case of Tong Seak Kan (2014) has established the true identity of the 
first defendant through a John Doe action against Google Inc. in the US and then obtained 
confirmation from two local network service providers. Consequently, Abdul Rahman Sebli J 
allowed the plaintiffs to rely on the presumption of publication and the burden was then shifted 
to the first defendant to prove his innocence. As such, these two cases have clearly indicated 
that the presumption of publication in section 114A is not automatic and its application will be 
determined by the court after considering the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Apart from its application, it must be borne in mind that the presumption is rebuttable 
i.e. the person against whom the presumption is applied to may adduce evidence to rebut it on 
the balance of probabilities. Mere denials by the defendant as have been shown in Tong Seak 
Kan (2014) and YB Dato’ Hj Husam Hj Musa (2015) are not acceptable to rebut the statutory 
presumption on a balance of probability. 
Finally, it is submitted that comprehensive analysis of the provision of section 114A of 
the Evidence Act 1950 and its application by judges in the aforesaid reported cases may be a 
good basis to concur with Peters (2015) that the new amendment is not oppressive as it sounds. 
Though some critics are worried and concerned about its implication on freedom of speech and 
expression, it must always be remembered that the cyberspace does not guarantee absolute 
freedom as what is illegal offline will also be illegal online. For that reason, Internet users in 
Malaysia must always be warry of various laws that have been enacted to govern publication 
of illegal content and they are no longer could hide their identities behind the cloak of 
anonymity. 
As to the position under Islamic legal principles, there are some jurists who have argued 
that in isolated cases, the accused / defendant might be requested to prove his innocence even 




though the general rule is that the onus is on the claimant or prosecution to prove the guilt of 
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